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I. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Immediately following the Supreme Court's opinion in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,' which sustained the constitutionality of the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Fairness Doctrine,2 a
flurry of articles appeared describing how to apply the doctrine vigor-
ously to new and different situations.3 Subsequently, especially after the
Court's decision in CBS v. Democratic National Committee4 curtailed ac-
cess possibilities, and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo5 refused
to sustain right to reply laws for candidates attacked by the print media,
most discussions of the Fairness Doctrine have addressed its constitu-
tionality.6 While initially interesting, this debate has grown as predict-
ably repetitious and unilluminating as a tenth rerun of "Kojak."
Furthermore, the debaters appear to have lost track of what the Fairness
Doctrine is and how it works.
Our purpose is quite simple. We seek to rectify these oversights
and, in the process, demonstrate that the Fairness Doctrine is incoherent
and unworkable. We will also demonstrate that the doctrine as it oper-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
** Windfohr Professor of Law, The University of Texas. Several people have reviewed earlier
drafts of this article and provided especially helpful criticism. Our thanks to Susan Bloch, Roy
Schotland, Michael Seidman, and Girardeau Spann of Georgetown and David Anderson, Douglas
Laycock, Richard Markovits, and Mark Yudof of Texas.
1. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
2. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1983).
3. In one of the longest pure citation footnotes the reader is likely to encounter, David Lange
cites them all. See Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: 4
Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1, 2 n.5 (1973).
4. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
5. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
6. Much of this literature is discussed in Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip of the First Amend-
ment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978).
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ates is wholly incongruous with the Fairness Doctrine its remaining sup-
porters describe. Our conclusion is that the Fairness Doctrine does
not-and cannot-work. Accordingly it should be repealed either by
legislative or administrative action.
The Fairness Doctrine, promulgated by the FCC several decades
ago,7 purports to require that radio and television broadcast station licen-
sees give adequate coverage to significant public issues and ensure that
such coverage is fair in that it accurately presents conflicting views on
those issues.8 Probably no law more clearly reflects the unique balance of
regulatory techniques by which the United States governs its broadcast
industry. Broadcasters are to be licensed to use, but not own, the radio
spectrum. 9 Once licensed, they are to be controlled principally by the
forces of competition rather than by government control or production
of their programs or schedules.10 Yet, while pursuing profits, these licen-
sees are also to act as public trustees of the airwaves.' 1
The Fairness Doctrine thus stands as a symbol of what Americans
hope for from the radio and television industry: neutral, detached pres-
entation of significant public issues. Such reportage should inform with-
out indoctrinating, producing an enlightened citizenry but avoiding
7. The general Fairness Doctrine is now incorporated in the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1983). This occurred in 1978. See Notice of Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg.
20,317, 20,317 n.1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Doctrine N01]. The roots of the doctrine are
much deeper. See id, at 20,319-22. Most commentators trace its origins to a 1929 decision of the
FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission. Id. at 20,319-20; see Great Lales Broadcasting,
3 F.R.C. Annual Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281
U.S. 706 (1930). Subsequently, the doctrine evolved, like a common law principle, through decisions
of the FCC acting on complaints or station applications. See Fairness Doctrine NOI, at 20,320. In
1949, the Commission issued a policy statement stating the doctrine in its present form. Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Report on Editori-
alizing]. In 1974, after a lengthy study, the FCC reaffirmed the doctrine, as a policy to be applied in
disputed cases. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standard of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair-
ness Report].
8. See Report on Editorializing, supra note 7, at 1249-50 (discussing a "long series of deci-
sions" reaffirming this affirmative responsibility on the part of broadcast licensees).
9. The Communications Act of 1934 specifically provides that a "station license shall not vest
in the licensee any right to operate the station nor any right in the use of the frequencies designated
in the license beyond the term thereof." 47 U.S.C. § 309(h)(1) (1982).
10. See g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-604 (1981) (upholding as not
inconsistent with the Communications Act of 1934 the FCC policy that reliance on the market is the
best method of promoting diversity in entertainment formats); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC regulation limiting licensing of powerful networks in certain locali-
ties sustained in order to enhance competition); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
475 (1940) ("Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it found
it, to permit a licensee to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive
to the public.").
11. See Fowler & Brennan, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv.
207, 213-17 (1982) (discussing origins of concept of broadcasters as community trustees).
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manipulation of voters' values by an entrenched, uncontrollable oligop-
oly motivated solely by a desire to maximize its own profits. The Fair-
ness Doctrine, in short, not only symbolizes the trustee obligations of
broadcast licensees, but also neatly encapsulates a journalistic code of
ethics to which most reporters and publishers, in all media, profess alle-
giance. This was the view of the FCC when it explained the Fairness
Doctrine in 1949:
If, as we believe to be the case, the public interest is best served in a
democracy through the ability of the people to hear expositions of the
various positions taken by responsible groups and individuals on par-
ticular topics and to choose between them, it is evident that broadcast
licensees have an affirmative duty generally to encourage and imple-
ment the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues over their
facilities .... 12
Notwithstanding these rather impressive credentials as a symbol of
virtuous aspirations, the Fairness Doctrine is today under heavy assault
on two fronts. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, which includes a subcommittee on commu-
nications, has introduced, and worked vigorously for passage of, a bill
that would, among other things, deny the FCC power to require "an
opportunity to be afforded for the presentation of any view on an is-
sue. ' ' 13 Not content to await the outcome of that legislative initiative, the
FCC has published a Notice of Inquiry that suggests the Commission
may bury the Fairness Doctrine administratively.
14
12. Report on Editorializing, supra note 7, at 1251.
13. S. 1917, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. RIc. S13,475-76 (1983) (the "Freedom of
Expression Act of 1983"). The introduction of the bill by Senator Packwood and his efforts to
obtain enactment are reflected throughout the hearings on the bill. See generally To Provide That
The Federal Communications Commission Shall Not Regulate the Content of Certain Communica-
tions: Hearings Before the Senate Comn. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Packwood Hearings].
14. See Fairness Doctrine N0, supra note 7, at 1. Whether the doctrine is mandated by the
Communications Act is a matter of debate. See id at 20,336-43. We do not address that question in
this article.
The issue arises because of an ambiguous congressional action in 1959. Initially, the doctrine
was said to rest solely on the general provision of the Act that commands the Commission to regu-
late in "the public interest." Id. at 20,337 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982)). In 1959, however,
Congress amended section 315 of the Act, which requires that licensees afford political candidates
equal time, to exempt appearances on certain news programs. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
274, 73 Stat. 557 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315). At the same time, Congress also provided that noth-
ing in the 1959 amendments was to be construed as "relieving broadcasters. . . from the obligation
imposed on them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportu-
nity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." Id.
The Supreme Court has stated that this amendment "ratified" the Fairness Doctrine. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969). Whether that statement is accurate and means
that the Commission cannot abrogate the doctrine administratively is unclear. See Fairness Doctrine
N01, supra note 7, at 20,342-43; FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3117 n.12 (1984)
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II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CURIOSITY
Most debates over the Fairness Doctrine begin with the same ques-
tion: Does it violate the first amendment's proscription of laws "abridg-
ing the right of freedom of speech or of the press?" The preoccupation of
scholars with this question is quite puzzling. Whether the Fairness Doc-
trine is constitutional is a thoroughly settled issue that deserves no ex-
tended discussion. The doctrine is, or is not, constitutional depending
solely on what one means by "constitutional."
The Fairness Doctrine is obviously constitutional if one tests that
assertion by asking whether a majority of the present Supreme Court, or
any reasonably foreseeable variant thereof in the next decade, will de-
clare it to be so. Without dissent,15 the Court held in the 1969 Red
Lion' 6 case that the Fairness Doctrine did not abridge anyone's first
amendment rights. That position was reaffirmed in 1981, again without
dissent. 17 The chance of convincing the Court to remove the Fairness
Doctrine from the backs of multibillion dollar corporations whose princi-
pal energies are directed to packaging sex, violence, and stereotyped
characters for sale to soap manufacturers and computer salesmen is
about the same as the probability that the Court will give pornographers
a first amendment license to thrust lewd photographs upon unsuspecting
and unwilling seventh graders.
Equally free from doubt, however, is the proposition that the Fair-
ness Doctrine is at odds with any general principle of the purposes, val-
ues, or meaning of the first amendment to which the Supreme Court has
subscribed in the past fifty years.' 8 No other Court decision over this
lengthy and otherwise meandering course of history suggests any toler-
ance for such governmental oversight of editors' choices respecting what
(expressing no view on the legality of any action by the FCC modifying or abandoning the doctrine).
See also supra note 7.
15. Justice Douglas did not participate in Red Lion but subsequently indicated that he would
not have supported the decision. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973)
(concurring).
16. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
17. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). Justices White, Rehnquist and Stevens dissented from
the majority opinion, but not on constitutional grounds. Id. at 397-419.
18. Leaving aside for a moment the unavoidable comparison with Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the contrast with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), is especially striking. In New York Times, the Court greatly limited a public figure's right to
sue a media defendant for defamation, in the interests of preserving the defendant's broad freedom to
exercise its first amendment rights. See id. at 277-80 ("actual malice" requirement imposed because
the fear of civil liability imposes too great a burden on the newspaper's exercise of first amendment
rights). Powe, "Mass Speech" and the Newer First,4mendment, 1982 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 243, chronicles
the unsuccessful attempts to transport Red Lion into the campaign finance cases, an area where
advocates supporting government laws limiting giving and spending typically have attempted to rely
on Red Lion's theory to support their cases.
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topics and views they will publish. In Red Lion, the Court simply served
up some trivial and irrelevant observations about broadcasting, sprinkled
in some novel and ridiculous statements about the underlying purposes
of the first amendment, and then pronounced these constitutional curios-
ities to be justifications for rejecting a first amendment challenge to the
Fairness Doctrine. For example, the Court cited the fact that "there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre-
quencies to allocate."' 19 The triviality and irrelevance of the observation
that scarce resources are scarce become clear when one substitutes for
the words "broadcast" and "frequencies" in the Court's statement,
words such as "publish" and "newsprint," or "make movies" and "film
footage," or "write letters" and "stamps. '20 That it costs money, that is,
consumes a scarce resource, to speak has never before or since in first
amendment jurisprudence been said to justify imposing a fairness doc-
trine on the speaker.
Alternatively, or additionally, the Red Lion opinion suggests that
the Fairness Doctrine is constitutional because it protects "the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences."' 21 No principle could be more at odds
with the bulk of first amendment jurisprudence, for it would justify any
governmental rule that told a speaker what to say on the ground that the
government had determined the public should hear it. The astonishing
breadth of the principle that control over utterances may be constitution-
ally justified by a public right to hear what government regulators deter-
mine listeners do or should prefer is tempered, thankfully, by the fact
that the Court has never relied upon that principle in resolving any other
issue outside the realm of commercial speech.
At other places, the Red Lion opinion wraps the Fairness Doctrine
in the mantle of antimonopoly policy. "It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licen-
19. 395 U.S. at 388.
20. One might argue that the present finite number of broadcast channels renders this analogy
inapt. However, given the size of the electromagnetic spectrum and given the current state of tech-
nology, many more broadcasters could be assigned frequencies. This suggests that, were demand
high enough-that is, if people who "want to broadcast" were willing to pay enough-frequencies
could be assigned to them. If people who wish to publish a newspaper are willing to pay for news-
print, they may do so; any difference between newsprint and broadcast frequencies is thus one of
degree, not of kind. See, eg., Freedom of Expression: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13 (1982) (statement of Solomon J.
Buchsboum, Executive Vice President, Bell Telephone Laboratories).
21. 395 U.S. at 390.
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see."' 22 Without the doctrine's constraints, broadcasters would "snuff out
the free speech of others. '23 That monopoly and free speech are incom-
patible is true; that the Fairness Doctrine has any relation to antimono-
poly policy is false. If a speaker, by speaking, monopolizes and thereby
snuffs out others' speech, then an uninhibited marketplace of ideas can be
attained only by total silence.
But one need not resort to the intemperate criticisms found in law
journals to compile a list of the errors of Red Lion. In the 1974 Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornilo24 case, the Court itself persuasively
provided a point-by-point refutation of Red Lion.25 Tornillo invalidated
on its face a Florida statute that granted political candidates a right to
equal space to reply to criticisms and attacks by a newspaper. The first
amendment, according to Tornillo, teaches that a government "compul-
sion to publish that which '"reason" tells [editors] should not be pub-
lished' is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly
desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitu-
tion and like many virtues it cannot be legislated."'26
How did the Tornillo Court reconcile Red Lion? By ignoring it:
Red Lion is nowhere cited in Tornillo. Does that perhaps suggest Red
Lion may be ripe for overruling? Certainly not: Red Lion survives
Tornillo because the former deals with broadcasting. 27 So spoke the
22. Id.
23. Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
24. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
25. Id. at 256-58.
26. Id. at 256. One line of first amendment decisions bears a superficial similarity to Red Lion.
The Court has occasionally held that the first amendment compels government to grant speakers
access to government property to express their views. See, eg., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
176-77 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the carrying of any flag, banner, or
device on Supreme Court grounds). This principle has also been extended to company-owned towns.
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946). Further, the Court has held that a state may
require that a privately-owned shopping center, to which the public is invited, accord some rights of
access to citizens seeking to exercise free speech and petition rights. See Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980).
In fact, however, these cases are inapposite. In none of them was the owner of the property
compelled to express any particular views himself or to edit his own statements. Like the Florida
statute in Tornillo, these cases only made property owners relinquish some property rights, not sub-
ject their own editorial choices to governmental regulation. Tornillo thus involved a less drastic
invasion of the editor's first amendment interests than Red Lion. Curiously, the Supreme Court that
decided Red Lion also took the view that the Communications Act of 1934 prohibits the FCC from
requiring that speakers be granted access to broadcast facilities not licensed to them. See FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702-09 (1979).
27. Possibly the most interesting contrast between Red Lion and Tornillo is the Court's view of
whether the existence and application of the law at issue will have a chilling effect on the decisions of
the media. Red Lion stands on the conclusion that the Fairness Doctrine will not chill broadcast-
ers-and that if it does it should be enforced more rigorously to warm them up. If the Fairness
Doctrine that exists in its supporters' mind does not chill broadcasters, they are a pretty hardy breed
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Court in 1981.28 Does that make any sense? No. Indeed, this is where
we came in. The Fairness Doctrine is, or is not, clearly constitutional
depending solely on what one means by "constitutional."
III. AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM
The foregoing expresses, in summary form, our reasons for believing
that respect for established, widely-shared first amendment values, such
as those reflected in Tornillo, compels the conclusion that the Fairness
Doctrine should be discarded. Indeed, the constitutional case against the
doctrine is as elementary as it is overwhelming. But that is not our prin-
cipal point. The fact of the matter is that, wholly apart from first amend-
ment considerations, the Fairness Doctrine does not, will not, and cannot
work. And that is our principal point. At best, the Fairness Doctrine is,
like the 1962 New York Mets, a glorious but futile symbol, full of won-
drous pretension and promise, yet utterly devoid of performance.
As a practical matter, the Fairness Doctrine is a failure for two dis-
tinct reasons. First, viewed as an exercise of regulatory power, there is
no reason to believe that the doctrine achieves its purposes or does so in
an efficient manner.2 9 Second, as a legal principle it is utterly meaning-
less. 30 In our view, these practical considerations are sufficiently compel-
ling that, even were the constitutional issues more nearly balanced on
both sides, the case for abolishing the Fairness Doctrine would be clear.
A. The Fairness Doctrine as a Regulatory Policy.
Perhaps, once upon a time, regulation was valued for its own sake.
To test the merits of a regulation one asked only whether it directed
and should be compared to their distant cousins, garden-variety timid newspaper editors, who, if
faced with something like the Fairness Doctrine, would be frozen. Such at least was the teaching of
Tornillo. One need not have spent time in newsrooms in the respective industries to know that the
Supreme Court is not discussing anything that one would recognize as the United States. Consider
the comments of NBC News' Bill Monroe, a reporter who has spent time in newsrooms in each
industry:
Some years ago as a young man I worked for a newspaper. I was very impressed with the
spirit of independence on the part of the editors of the newspapers. They didn't care if
something they put in the paper offended a major political figure. Later I went to a televi-
sion station and slowly I discovered that the managers of the television station were a little
afraid of government. They were timid, conscious of government looking over their shoul-
der in a way that the newspaper publisher and editor for whom I had worked had not been.
Freedom of the Press, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ROUND TABLE 58-59 (July 29-30,
1975). See also THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND BROADCASTING: PRESS FREEDOMS AND BROAD-
CAST JOURNALISM 30-31 (H. Rundell & J. Heuterman eds. 1978) (transcription of 1978 Edward R.
Morrow Symposium; statement of Bill Monroe).
28. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
29. See infra notes 31-70 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
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someone to do something that, if done, comported with the public inter-
est. By such standards, as we observed at the outset, the Fairness Doc-
trine would receive high marks. So, of course, would a regulation telling
restaurants to provide fast, clean, cheap service in comfortable surround-
ings. Yet, it is difficult to believe that anyone would assess the merits of
such a regulation today without also measuring its practical effects, its
costs, and the costs and effects of alternative methods of achieving the
goals of the regulation. By such standards, the Fairness Doctrine ap-
pears to be an unjustified method of achieving its laudable goals.
Those goals, of course, are to encourage full and fair coverage of
controversial issues. They reflect a desire to mold the behavior of both
broadcasters and their audiences. For the latter, the Fairness Doctrine
represents a governmental policy that citizens ought to be well-informed
even if that is not a priority of the citizen. For the former, the Fairness
Doctrine sets forth a standard of conduct to be followed in the operation
of the station, although it is obvious that achieving the goals of the doc-
trine will be accomplished, to some extent, without any Fairness Doc-
trine. A station with news programs will introduce viewers or listeners
to some facets of public controversies simply by reporting the main
events of the day. Furthermore, journalistic ethics will cause some re-
porters and news programs to be scrupulously fair as a matter of profes-
sionalism. The Fairness Doctrine is aimed at those stations that would
avoid controversy, or air biased or misleading programming. At this
point, the apparently complementary goals of the doctrine push in oppo-
site directions in practice. If the issues treated are in fact controversial,
then viewers and listeners may be more sensitive to whether or not the
treatment is fair. If controversy is avoided no such problems occur. Be-
cause it turns out that there is no penalty, because there is no enforce-
ment, for failure to cover controversy, 31 broadcasters can-and everyone
agrees some do32-avoid some fairness problems simply by not offering
programming on some issues.33 Further, once a station does decide to
31. The Commission has only once held a broadcaster to have violated the obligation to cover
controversial issues. See Mink v. WHAR, 59 F.C.C.2d 987, 997 (1976) (Clarksburg, W. Va. radio
station violated Fairness Doctrine by failing to cover the issue of strip mining); see also Fairness
Report, supra note 7, at 10 ("we have no intention of becoming involved in the selection of issues to
be discussed, nor do we expect a broadcaster to cover each and every important issue which may
arise in his community").
32. See, eg., Fairness Doctrine NOI, supra note 7, at 20,332, and sources cited therein.
33. See, eg., Freedom of Expression: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, 127 (1982) (statement of Bill Monroe):
It seems clear to me that many station owners and their managers, though they might
not wish to admit it, feel that their commercial lives depend on minimizing controversy.
Broadcasters do not feel free to follow their own consciences as journalists because they
have to answer to a bureaucratic conscience, with its close-packed pages of rules, regula-
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broadcast some programming dealing with a controversial issue, it can
determine largely as it pleases how much should be devoted to the differ-
ing viewpoints and who and what materials to use in presenting each
side. In order to reduce the need for close and sustained agency supervi-
sion of broadcasters, the Commission has built into the doctrine a re-
markable amount of broadcaster discretion.34 As a result, surprisingly
little balance is necessary to meet the obligation to cover all sides of an
issue.
This, in brief, is the Fairness Doctrine about which so many acco-
lades are heard. But its proponents often do not argue in favor of the
doctrine just described. Enamored with its goals, they praise a doctrine
that does not exist. In our experience, defenders of the Fairness Doctrine
fail to address the question whether practicalities of administration and
enforcement limit the sweep of the goals of the doctrine. Fairness Doc-
trine proponents consistently (1) mischaracterize its effects; 35 (2) ignore
its costs; 36 and (3) overlook the availability of competition as an alterna-
tive.37 To the critical observer, then, the doctrine is an unduly expensive
regulatory venture whose real world effects may well be to produce re-
sults at odds with its own asserted purposes.
1. Mischaracterizing Effects. First, the Fairness Doctrine is often
explained as one that compels fairness or access by neglected groups by
substituting viewers' choices regarding what they wish to hear or see for
broadcasters' decisions as to what to broadcast. This was a principal
reason advanced by the Supreme Court for upholding the doctrine in
Red Lion.38 The Fairness Doctrine, in fact, does no such thing. Instead
of substituting viewer or citizen control for broadcaster control of pro-
gramming, to the extent the doctrine works it substitutes monolithic gov-
ernmental choice for the programs that otherwise would result from
broadcasters' competition for viewers' and listeners' time and attention.
Its proponents mischaracterize the operation of the doctrine and the sys-
tem of program selection that would prevail in its absence.
When fairness regulations are enforced, no deity or Platonic Guard-
ian determines whether a program is fair. That decision is made in the
tions, and precedents. So the electronic media, by contrast with what the first amendment
intended, are stifled and stunted.
34. See, eg., Fairness Report, supra note 7, at 10-17. "We believe that the public is best served
by a system which allows individual broadcasters considerable discretion in selecting the manner of
coverage, the appropriate spokesmen, and the techniques of production and presentation." Id. at 16.
35. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
38. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90.
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first instance by a government attorney in the FCC's Mass Media Bu-
reau-an attorney so publicly unaccountable that his or her name or title
will not even appear on an FCC organization chart. That individual is,
of course, following a more or less coherent set of publicly reviewable
guidelines.39 She may be responding to the complaints of a few listeners
or viewers, but "the public" whose interests are being enforced is one
that exists in that attorney's-or her bosses'-eyes, and its listening and
viewing preferences have never been systematically canvassed-much
less proven to be uniform-by the FCC.4°
Conversely, were there no fairness regulations, the most a broad-
caster could hope to gain from misinforming or misleading its listeners is
the allegiance of those already ideologically committed to the broad-
caster's point of view. That allegiance, probably depending on the issue
addressed, may or may not counterbalance the loss of viewers who are
not ideologues.41 But, in the absence of the doctrine, broadcasters would
have almost no incentive to provide erroneous or one-sided information
to those who do not want it or to refuse all coverage of issues that inter-
est many viewers or listeners. They do, after all, have to convince some-
one to turn on the set and tune in their frequency.42
To the extent that the doctrine has practical effects, it is as likely to
avoid the appearance of one-sided presentations as to compel fairness.
Although the regulation purports to require that some minimal coverage
be given to large public issues, that aspect has proven unmanageable and,
with a single exception in its entire history, unenforceable.43 The Fair-
39. See FCC, THE LAW OF POLITICAL BROADCASTING AND CABLECASTING: A POLITICAL
PRIMER 69-71 (1984) (outlining the requirements of the Fairness Doctrine within the context of
political broadcasting).
40. See Fairness Report, supra note 7, at 8. ("[W]e [the FCC] do not monitor broadcasts for
possible violations, but act on the basis of complaints received from interested citizens. These com-
plaints are not forwarded to the licensee for his comments unless they present prima facie evidence
of a violation.").
41. For example, we assume relatively few people have a firm ideological belief respecting the
causes of federal budget deficits. If we are correct, then broadcast coverage that points to rising
interest rates as the sole cause of deficits will harm the station's ratings more than it will help them.
We also assume that most people believe incest should be a criminal act. If that assumption is
correct, then crusading for the retention of criminal penalties for incest-without covering the alter-
native views that criminal sanctions for intra-family conduct are difficult to apply fairly and that at
least consenting adults should have wider personal liberty-is unlikely to drive many listeners away.
See also infra note 42.
42. The doctrine may, then, require the committed ideologue not to air one-sided presentations
to similarly committed ideologues. If, indeed, the doctrine is supposed to protect the rights of listen-
ers and viewers, this is a very curious result. Such communications may offend persons who do not
agree. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text for discussion of WXUR case. Those persons
need not tune to the station, however, for-unlike newspapers-radio and television outlets are rela-
tively plentiful in most communities.
43. See supra note 31 and sources cited therein.
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ness Doctrine does not identify specific programs that should be broad-
cast and require broadcasters to do so. Virtually all the doctrine
commands is that a broadcaster that does one thing-for example,
broadcasts a program on oil production-must also do another-for ex-
ample, include in that program, or another, the view that oil production
is controlled by a domestic cartel and the view that it is not controlled by
a cartel. Consistent with the Fairness Doctrine the broadcaster can al-
ways choose not to do the first thing. In such case, of course, neither the
broadcaster nor the regulation furthers any public interest.
Furthermore, even when the broadcaster airs a program with seem-
ingly balanced coverage, what is fostered may well be more the illusion of
fairness than a genuine exploration of positions. The Fairness Doctrine
speaks in terms of balanced coverage-presenting both sides of contro-
versial issues. In a typical contested complaint, the broadcaster will be
charged with presenting only one side of an issue and ignoring the other
side.44 This method of applying the doctrine can have a perverse impact
in light of the reality that many of the major controversial issues of our
time are multi-sided. Because of a tendency to think in terms of two-
sided issues, it is not surprising that many are characterized as the "Re-
publican" side and the "Democratic" side.
For example, in the early 1970's a group on the Republican right
pressed a major fairness complaint. 45 That group argued that its very
hawkish positions on national security issues were being virtually ig-
nored; the debate in issue was telecast as if the only choices were those of
the Democratic left and the Nixon administration. Although the Com-
mission and a reviewing court decided the case adversely to the com-
plainants on a different ground, the complaint could just as easily have
been disposed of on the ground that the network had in fact provided a
full and fair discussion of national defense by putting forward the domi-
nant positions of each of the two major parties. It should also be noted
that during this period the views of the more hawkish Democrats were
underplayed as well.
What this illustrates is the very real risk that the minority positions
of the major parties will be ignored even as the broadcasters remain in
full compliance with the Fairness Doctrine. The viewpoint of the domi-
nant Democratic faction is presented and countered not by the minority
view within the Democratic party, but by the view of the dominant fac-
tion within the Republican party. This practice usually will satisfy the
Fairness Doctrine while providing no coverage to the views of those with
44. See, eg., the cases discussed infra in notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text for discussion of the ASCEF case.
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nonmainstream positions. Enforcing the Fairness Doctrine in this man-
ner will provide some information, although largely the type that would
be offered in the absence of any legal compulsion, but does not require
that broadcasters seek out views that do not dominate traditional
debates.
Properly viewed, then, the Fairness Doctrine substitutes potential
bureaucratic control of programming for the operation of the market-
place with a principal end of avoiding the appearance of biased program-
ming concerning controversial issues. It does not force or even
encourage broadcasters to give citizens information for which they have
expressed a desire, nor does it provide broadcasters an incentive to seek
out unconventional views.
2. Ignoring Costs. Proponents of the Fairness Doctrine not only
misrepresent its effects but also appear to ignore its costs. In fact, like
any other regulation, the Fairness Doctrine imposes costs of enforcement
on the government and of compliance on those subject to it-here,
broadcast licensees. What are these costs?
The effects on licensees are easiest to assess. Unless the doctrine is
totally unenforceable, it imposes costs on those subject to it. As we have
just observed, however, broadcasters can avoid these costs by choosing to
be silent on controversial issues or to offer programs that offend no one.
By itself, then, the Fairness Doctrine makes more attractive to broadcast-
ers the option of self-censorship on controversial issues. It is as though
the FCC had imposed a tax on reporting matters of public debate.
It may not mean much to NBC to have a fairness complaint pending
for a year stemming from a charge that its 1978 mini-series "Holocaust"
violated the doctrine by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to
present the view that there was no "German policy of Jewish extermina-
tion during World War II. ' '46 The same cannot be said for allegations
that are not absurd on their face or for stations that lack network clout.
Consider KHOM in Houma, Louisiana which, like so many stations
prior to 1980, carried Ronald Reagan's radio commentary program.4 7 In
the first eighteen months the station aired the program it did not receive
a single complaint from anyone in its listening area. But the airing of one
program produced letters from nine individuals and groups outside the
Houma area claiming they were entitled to free time to respond. KHOM
spent time reviewing the tape, and unable to decide whether there had
been personal attacks, consequently paid its "tax" to a Washington law-
46. In re Application of NBC for Renewal of License of Station WNBC-TV, 71 F.C.C.2d 250,
251 (1979).
47. Packwood Hearings, supra note 13, at 125 (statement of Raymond Saadi, station KHOM).
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yer who advised the station to provide the free air time to those claiming
it.48
More significant were the costs to station KREM in Spokane and to
its general manager, Eugene Wilkin.49 In defending an on-the-spot deci-
sion not to allow representatives claiming to speak for all environmental-
ists to respond to an editorial favoring Expo 74, the station ran up legal
fees of over $20,000, spent 480 hours of executive time, and endured a
delay in license renewal.50 Wilkin was branded as "controversial" and
his broadcast management career was ended.51 Why? The four individu-
als who claimed to represent all of Spokane's environmentalists were rep-
resentatives of eight neighbors who had broken off from the city's major
environmental organization to form their own ad hoe committee. Wilkin
saw them only once, on the day he asked for verification that they did, in
fact, represent all environmentalists. On that day they responded, "We'll
be back with that."' 52 They misspoke: Instead of "that" they came back
with the FCC and a full field investigation of the station.5 3
Whether or not these are isolated cases, they are known to the
closely-knit industry. The costs varied from a little above de minimis for
NBC, to modest for KHOM, to expensive for KREM, to incredibly high
for Eugene Wilkin. But the very fact that there are costs and the costs
can be significant, generates incentives to avoid them. Other factors,
such as competition from other media, may force broadcasters to cover
controversial issues and to present various viewpoints about them. Nev-
ertheless, to the extent it has its own impact, the effect of the Fairness
Doctrine is quite the opposite.
The only way to avoid this result would be to enforce the Fairness
Doctrine so thoroughly that licensees could not escape this "tax," but
would be forced to "pay" it. Given the proven impracticality of defining
what issues must be covered,5 4 this seems an implausible option. Even if
that hurdle could somehow be overcome, when one compares the extent
of programming covered by the regulation to the resources available to
the FCC, one must wonder what the Fairness Doctrine could plausibly
achieve. At the end of 1983, 8216 commercial radio stations and 870
48. Id. at 125-26.
49. See In re Sherwyn Heckt, 40 F.C.C.2d 1150 (1973).
50. H. GELLER, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING: PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED
COURSES OF ACTION 41-42 (1973).
51. See Packwood Hearings, supra note 13, at 227-28 (statement of Eugene Wilkin).
52. Id. at 228.
53. See id. at 227.
54. See Mink v. WHAR, 59 F.C.C.2d 987, 997 (1976), the single instance where the Commis-
sion has found a broadcaster to have violated the obligation to cover controversial issues, and Fair-
ness Report, supra note 7, at 10, as evidence of this impracticability.
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commercial television stations were operating in the United States. 55 If,
on average, each of these broadcasts a total of sixty minutes of news a
day, that would yield 9086 hours per day of news programming that
must conform to the Fairness Doctrine. That amounts to the equivalent
of 39,796,680 five-minute newscasts per year nationwide.56
Performing this herculean enforcement task is the FCC, with a total
budget in recent years of around $90,000,000. 57 Of course, not all of
these funds or all of its employees are available to enforce the Fairness
Doctrine. Among its other duties, the FCC not only manages the entire
electromagnetic spectrum but also regulates all interstate telephone and
telegraph service, all American communications satellites, and all the
technical operations of its broadcast licensees. At present, the Commis-
sion also has pending 16,000 applications for multi-channel, multi-point
distribution system permits, and over 12,000 applications for low-power
TV stations. 58
These data do not reveal precisely how much time and resources the
Commission can direct to Fairness Doctrine issues. Surely, however,
they demonstrate that any enforcement scheme must select very few
targets for investigation, 59 and consequently, must operate oblivious of
the kind and quality of informational programming generally being
broadcast throughout the United States. 6° Further, the FCC has no pro-
55. BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK 1984 at A-2.
56. Not all newscasts will be unique, for some stations will broadcast identical network pro-
gramming during some or all of their news periods.
57. See Standing Pat, BROADCASTING, Dec. 17, 1984, at 7.
58. Report and Order in the Matter of the Amendment of § 73.3555 of the Commission's
Rules, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,877, 31,881 (1984).
59. See Fairness Report, supra note 7, at 8. ("As a matter of general procedure, [the Commis-
sion does] not monitor broadcasts for possible violations, but act[s] on the basis of complaints re-
ceived from interested citizens."). See also infra note 61.
60. James McKinney, Chief of the FCC's Mass Media Bureau, explained how the FCC actually
examines fairness complaints:
It's been said that it's not a good idea to watch how legislation or sausage is made.
And I want to raise a new issue with you here today because I don't think it's very pleasant
to understand how Fairness Doctrine complaints are adjudicated. But it might be interest-
ing for you to know the process we go through here at the agency, at the lower staff level
before the Commissioners get it for a final decision.
We in fact sit down with tape recordings, with videotapes of what is being broadcast,
what has been broadcast on a specific station. We compare that to newspapers and other
public statements that are made in the community. We try to make a decision as to
whether the issue is controversial and whether it is of public importance in that community
which may be two thousand miles away. And when it comes down to the final analysis, we
take out stopwatches and we start counting seconds and minutes that are devoted to one
issue compared to seconds and minutes devoted to the other side of that issue. All of that
is done by people here in Washington who work for me, who may have never been a
journalist in their life, many of whom are attorneys. But in the final analysis we start
giving our judgment as to what words mean in the context of what was said on the air,
what was the twist that was given that specific statement or that commercial advertise-
ment, was it really pro-nuclear power or was it pro some other associated issue. Given that
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gram for systematically monitoring compliance with the Fairness Doc-
trine or for randomly targeting stations for investigation at the FCC's
initiative.6 1
That a rule seeks to govern many transactions or episodes does not
necessarily mean it lacks bite. Consider, for example, the antitrust pro-
scription against price-fixing or the criminal law prohibition of shoplift-
ing. The Fairness Doctrine, however, is particularly likely to be
dependent for its efficacy on the governmental resources devoted to it;
because the doctrine does not provide clear standards for distinguishing
between legal and illegal conduct, 62 only the FCC can tell whether a vio-
lation occurs. For the same reason, penalties for noncompliance are not
severe. The Commission could scarcely justify revoking a license for
conduct that was not clearly illegal when undertaken. Finally, no private
enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine is authorized. These factors sug-
gest that only repeated, egregious violations of the doctrine by an espe-
cially visible licensee are likely to result in substantial penalties.
Moreover, proscriptions against price-fixing and shoplifting do not in
themselves generate incentives to avoid the purposes the rules seek to
promote-incentives that thereby increase the difficulty of enforcement.
The Fairness Doctrine gives licensees a substantial incentive to avoid its
purpose of informing the public about controversial issues. A prohibi-
tion on shoplifting does not make stealing merchandise more attractive.
Perhaps the imbalance between enforcement resources and enforce-
ment responsibilities means the Fairness Doctrine is a hollow command.
More plausibly, it means the doctrine has substantial force only for the
most visible broadcasters-the three dominant television networks and
their affiliated station licensees.6 3
An assessment of the effects and costs of the Fairness Doctrine
paints a gloomy portrait indeed. For control by market forces the doc-
trine substitutes governmental control over programming, largely to at-
tain the end of avoiding the appearance of one-sided presentations. The
principal effect of the regulation is to reduce stations' incentives to broad-
cast controversy over public issues. This effect, ironically and thankfully,
kind of governmental review, does that change anyone's mind as to the chilling effect of
having government involved in the process?
J. McKinney, Remarks at FCC Fairness Doctrine Hearings (Feb. 8, 1985) (transcript of audio re-
cording on file with Duke Law Journal).
61. See Fairness Report, supra note 7, at 8. Curiously, the Commission asserts that the fact that
it examines very few broadcasts and does no systematic monitoring or targeting for compliance
review are reasons to retain the rule. Id. at 7-8. The position expressed in the Fairness Report seems
to be that the Fairness Doctrine is an acceptable regulation because it does not noticeably affect
licensees.
62. See infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
63. But see the case studies cited infra at notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
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is mitigated by the FCC's apparent inability, given its limited resources,
to enforce the doctrine except randomly or against the most visible
broadcasters. 4
We have yet to discover a defense of the Fairness Doctrine that
takes account of its practical effects and costs. Were such a defense at-
tempted, however, it would only begin the analysis, not end it. For the
question would remain whether a more practical and effective method is
available to achieve the goals of the Fairness Doctrine. In failing to con-
sider whether preferable alternatives exist, proponents of the Fairness
Doctrine commit a third error.
3. Overlooking Alternatives. Competition among broadcasters for
viewers' time and attention is at least as likely as enforcement of a Fair-
ness Doctrine to serve the laudable public interests for which the doc-
trine was developed. 65 Unless radio and television are unique among all
media of mass communications, the evidence that competition will work
satisfactorily is overwhelming. Sometimes presentations in other media
provide balanced coverage of all sides of controversial issues. Other
64. The FCC has been quite proud of its limited enforcement role. The 1974 Fairness Report
pointedly noted: "Thus broadcasters are not burdened with the task of answering idle or capricious
complaints. By way of illustration, the Commission received some 2400 fairness complaints in fiscal
1973, only 94 of which were forwarded to licensees for their comments." Fairness Report, supra note
7, at 8. Only seven of these resulted in findings of violations. As then-Commissioner Glen Robinson
observed two years later, the small number of adverse findings can only be the result of three
things-(l) incredible fairness, (2) remarkably ineffective enforcement, or (3) a standard of licensee
discretion so broad almost anything will stand-and he seriously doubted the first. In re The Han-
dling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Commu-
nications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 710 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
65. There have been two major alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine considered over the last
decade. One is some form of open access and the other is Henry Geller's 10-issue listing. Like the
FCC, we believe neither is particularly apt for obtaining either lively debate or coverage of important
issues.
Access proposals in one form or another have been made since Red Lion. See especially the
literature cited supra, note 3. While we see much that is desirable in a station adopting an access
policy, nothing in any of the proposals assures that any particular issues will be covered. Although
the example seems unbelievable on its face, a San Francisco station with an access policy received
but three access messages relating to Watergate or the impeachment controversy between December
1972 and Richard Nixon's resignation. In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 74 F.C.C.2d 163, 174
(1979). We cannot guarantee that a station would use its own time better than that time would be
used if delegated to others, but the likelihood of better use by the station, which is, after all, in the
programming business, is quite high.
The Geller ten-issue proposal calls for a post hoc determination by each station of what were
the ten most significant issues it covered during the prior year and a listing of representative pro-
gramming on these issues as well as the partisan spokespersons who addressed them. The proposal
is a wonderful opportunity for complainants to second-guess the station on covering the wrong issues
or the right issues with the wrong people. The FCC rejected it as little more than an additional
paperwork requirement, id at 179, an analysis that appears apt.
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times they do not. In all cases, however, the satisfactory answer has
been, and continues to be, to rely on competition to produce the full
story.
For example, no regulation required that the film "The China Syn-
drome" adequately portray all views on the risks of melt-downs in nu-
clear power plants. No law required that the Washington Post fully cover
the election of members of the District of Columbia convention to draft a
state constitution. No federal rule provided that the publishers of Rich-
ard Nixon's Memoirs include a balanced summary of George McGov-
er's campaign platform. No government agency saw to it that rebuttals
be delivered on behalf of individuals parodied in Gilbert and Sullivan
operettas. These and countless other flagrant "violations" of the "fair-
ness doctrine" did not go unnoticed,66 but neither were they occasions
for imposing a fairness obligation on these other media. Films, newspa-
pers, books, live theater-and all other media except radio and televi-
sion-flourish under a regime that eschews governmental assurance of
fairness for the results generated by popular choice among competing
voices.
Nor is there any reason to believe that radio and television are
unique in any relevant way. Neither has any peculiar ability to distort
information. Neither is sheltered from competition with other media in a
way that those others are not. It might be contended that the three dom-
inant television networks are effectively protected against competition
from other television sources. That has been true in the past,67 but will
not be so in the future.68 Furthermore, the previous insulation of the
ABC, CBS, and NBC networks derived from a series of governmental
regulations, many of which have been reversed, that rest on no enduring
public interest policy.6 9 Thus, if television network concentration is the
rationale for the Fairness Doctrine, no public policies would be disserved
by choosing to deconcentrate networking rather than to promulgate the
Fairness Doctrine.
66. See, eg., Schrag, By The People: The Political Dynamics of a Constitutional Convention, 72
GEo. L.J 819, 848 (1984) (noting that the Washington Post carried but a single story on the cam-
paign for delegates to the D.C. constitutional convention).
67. See S. BESEN, T. KRATTENMAKER, A. METZGER, & J. WOODBURY, MISREGULATING
TELEVISION: NETwoRK DOMINANCE AND THE F.C.C. 4-17 (1984) (pointing to entry barriers im-
posed by governmental regulation as protecting network dominance).
68. See id. at 17-20 (predicting a substantially different competitive environment by the end of
the decade due to relaxed regulatory barriers).
69. See id. at 168-73 (criticizing present regulatory policies as harmful). See also Besen & Krat-
tenmaker, Regulating Network Television, REGULATION, May/June, 1981, at 27-34 (characterizing
FCC policies as "mis-regulation" and concluding that "the FCC spent over thirty years adopting
doubtful solutions based on dubious premises").
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Finally, to revert to the constitutional theme, competition as a
method of achieving fairness comports more squarely with the policies
underlying the first amendment. As the Supreme Court explained it, in a
non-broadcast context:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ulti-
mately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.70
We fail to see how proponents of the Fairness Doctrine can square their
position with this view of the policies underlying the first amendment.
4. Summing Up: Net Effects of the Fairness Doctrine. A mathe-
matical calculation of the costs and benefits of the Fairness Doctrine is
not feasible. Rudimentary figures for such an exercise, including the av-
erage amounts of news coverage or broadcast time in various media and
the costs of different methods of news gathering and disseminating, are
not routinely available. Such a calculation, in any event, probably would
be beside the point. The purpose of the doctrine is to produce a quality
of reporting-balanced and fair-that is not quantifiable and whose ben-
eficial effects are subtle and occur over very long periods of time.
This should not preclude, however, a generalized assessment of the
utility of the Fairness Doctrine as a tool for regulating radio and televi-
sion. When one considers critically the probable effects of the doctrine,
its public and private costs, and the results that can be achieved by rely-
ing on alternative and cost-free techniques, the doctrine's principal net
effects appear to be: (1) to foist upon broadcast licensees the FCC's view
of what are important positions on public issues, and (2) to reduce incen-
tives among broadcasters to compete for listeners' and viewers' attention
by offering programs that address controversial issues. To the extent that
these effects are not realized, this is due to the fact that (1) systematic
monitoring of compliance with the Fairness Doctrine is impossible, given
the relative size of the industry and resources of the agency; and (2) com-
petition with other media for the public's attention and trust are likely to
force broadcasters to cover many sides of significant public issues. At
best, then, it is difficult to grasp how anyone who shares the goals pur-
portedly sought by the Fairness Doctrine can argue that we are better off
with it than without it.
70. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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B. The Fairness Doctrine as a Legal Principle.
1. The Problem. Those who remain unpersuaded that the Fair-
ness Doctrine is an ill-advised-indeed, probably counterproductive-
regulatory policy necessarily must agree that the doctrine, if it is to work
successfully, requires the government to walk a tightrope in defining that
which does and does not violate the rule. If, to avoid excessive self-cen-
sorship, the doctrine applies too loosely or infrequently, it will not
achieve reasonable balance. Conversely, if the Fairness Doctrine tightly
constricts all programming that might plausibly touch upon a controver-
sial topic, it will unduly stifle creativity and generate excessively bland
programs. The FCC, in these circumstances, is much like Goldilocks
rummaging around the home of the Three Bears. The Fairness Doctrine
cannot be too hot, too big, or too hard. Nor can it be too cold, too small,
or too soft. It must be just right.
Avoiding this predicament is impossible and escaping it has proved
no easier task. While attempting to get the Fairness Doctrine just right,
the FCC and the federal courts have shown it to be, in fact, an incoherent
legal principle. Four cases starkly reveal the incoherence. Three of the
cases are the major fairness cases of the prior decade: Each resulted in
an opinion by the District of Columbia Circuit. The fourth ended at the
FCC. Although arguments can be made against illustration by example,
we believe that the problems of fairness enforcement illustrated in these
cases are inherent in the doctrine. We further believe that if the Fairness
Doctrine cannot solve these cases, proponents of the doctrine bear a very
heavy burden of explaining just what cases it can handle and why they
are sufficiently important to justify the costs of the doctrine.
2. The Incoherence of the Fairness Doctrine Today.
a. ASCEF.71  In the mid-1970's, the American Security Council
Education Foundation (ASCEF) presented the FCC with a study of CBS
News' handling of "national security issues." Using four subtopics-Vi-
etnam, American military and foreign affairs, Soviet military and foreign
policy, and Chinese military and foreign policy-as aspects of the over-
arching national security umbrella, ASCEF charged that CBS had vio-
lated the Fairness Doctrine by presenting stories that either supported
the then-current perception that the Soviet threat was well-met by Amer-
ican military preparations or by presenting information suggesting that
the Soviet threat was less serious than the Nixon administration per-
71. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. CBS, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 366 (1977), affid en banc
sub nom. American Sec. Council Educ. Found v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979). An excellent
discussion of the complaint, prior to any FCC action, appears in F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys,
THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRsr AMENDMENT 167-91 (1976).
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ceived and that the United States should decrease its national security
efforts. All but ignored, ASCEF alleged, was information suggesting that
the Soviet threat was consistently greater than perceived and should be
countered by increasing American military spending. Essentially what
ASCEF charged was that on the most important issue of the time-war
and peace--one television network was systematically feeding its viewers
a distorted and unfair picture over the range of issues encompassing na-
tional security.
The FCC declined to hold a hearing on the issue. It dismissed AS-
CEF's complaint for failure to present a particular, well-defined issue as
the Fairness Doctrine requires. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed on precisely the same
ground.72 Even if the complaint were correct, the court held, the com-
plainant has a duty to present a sufficiently manageable issue to the Com-
mission for determination. Here, the majority concluded, the issue was
too big and too amorphous. Three dissenters found that conclusion ri-
diculous. The issue "was plain as day: whether this nation should do
more, less, or the same about perceived threats to its national security.1 73
If the charge by ASCEF were accurate, then CBS' overly-dovish position
constituted a massive fairness violation. Yet in response the majority
ducked the hard questions, "instead carving an ill-defined safe harbor
into which the Commission may sail when the waters are rough."'74 Like
Papa Bear's bed, the issue ASCEF presented was too big and too hard for
the Fairness Doctrine.
b. NBC.75  In late 1969, NBC Nightly News carried a three-part
story on air traffic safety. One of the segments contained an interview
with a private pilot who had circled Shea Stadium during a World Series
game. That same segment contained a longer interview with a senior
airline pilot, a family man with years of experience flying, who authorita-
tively stated that the greatest danger in commercial aviation came from
private pilots. The NBC reporter twice stated that the private pilots were
a danger in the crowded air around major airports. Thus it was difficult
to escape the conclusion that, correctly or not, private pilots had been
attacked. Their trade association unsuccessfully contended that the Fair-
ness Doctrine had been violated.
72. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
73. Id. at 467 (Wilkey, J., dissenting, joined by MacKinnon and Robb, JJ.) (emphasis omitted).
74. Id. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
75. In re NBC, 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970).
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The Commission agreed with NBC that the programs had been
about "Air Traffic." Problems relating to private pilots and the hazards
they might create constituted a sub-issue, and, although a broadcaster
must be fair overall, it need not be fair on each sub-issue. Thus the case
was the opposite of ASCEF. In NBC, the private pilots lost because their
issue, even if controversial, was, like Baby Bear's chair, too small.
c. Accuracy in Media. 76 How about a case that, like Baby Bear's
porridge, is just right? That was NBC's Peabody Award-winning "Pen-
sions: The Broken Promise." The program was a wonderful hour of
prime time muckraking that focused on private pension plans in the era
immediately before federal regulation. Although the moderator, Edwin
Newman, made an obligatory bow to the fact that not all private pension
programs had faults, the dominant theme of the program was that a
great many employees who were anticipating a nice pension in retirement
would find they had none. Case history after case history was examined:
bankruptcy, nonvesting pensions, inadequate set-aside. As Newman said
in conclusion: "The situation, as we've seen it, is deplorable."77 Accu-
racy in Media thought NBC had done a hatchet job on private pensions.
One need not be an ideological critic to note that the muckraking style of
the program was designed to show a serious problem without wasting
time on those pension plans that were in good shape.
NBC's lawyers handled the problem by belittling the program's pur-
poses and achievements. Instead of "Pensions: The Broken Promise,"
the lawyers characterized it as "Pensions: Some Broken Promises," a
program about the rather mundane topic of "some of the problems in-
volved in some private pension plans."'7 8 To the rejoinder that they were
not describing the program that NBC aired nor one that would win a
Peabody, the lawyers responded that NBC's characterization to the
Commission had to be accepted unless it were unreasonable. The Com-
mission found that characterization preposterous. Like Goldilocks tast-
ing Baby Bear's porridge, the FCC pronounced the Accuracy in Media
complaint just right: NBC had violated the Fairness Doctrine. 79
NBC's appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit presented several
arguments. It repeated the claim that its own characterization was bind-
ing because it was reasonable and also asserted that a holding against
NBC would signal the end of muckraking documentaries. Indeed, such a
holding would be a clear warning to all broadcasters to shy away from
76. Accuracy in Media, Inc., v. NBC, 44 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973), rey'd sub norm., NBC v. FCC,
516 F.2d 1101, 1124 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
77. Id at 1039.
78. Id. at 1027.
79. Id. at 1039.
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anything that spelled controversy. As an affidavit from David Brinkley
asked, would a program on shoddy highway construction have to devote
a reasonable amount of its time to treating the viewers to a visual display
of properly constructed roads? 0
What the "Pensions" case taught was that the Fairness Doctrine
and aggressive broadcast journalism would not mix and one was going to
go. The three-judge panel appeared to understand this and reversed the
Commission, but on the highly questionable ground that the FCC should
have given greater deference to NBC's belittling characterization of its
program. 81 As soon as that conclusion was announced, however, the full
court voted to hear the case en banc.82 Apparently unable to agree on
what to do some three years after the program aired, the court then re-
turned the program to the original panel with a suggestion that the re-
cently-enacted federal pension reform laws had mooted the case.83 The
original panel then sent it back to the FCC with a like suggestion and the
case vanished.8 4 The porridge had gone cold.
What is one to make of a Fairness Doctrine-designed to protect
"the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences" 85-that does not apply to
unbalanced reporting about American military strength, air traffic safety,
and pension fund security? One might be tempted to conclude that the
doctrine has been effectively abrogated by these decisions. Such a con-
clusion, however, would be wrong. The Commission and the courts oc-
casionally do agree that a case is just right.
d. WXUR. Consider the controversy over the Reverend Carl
McIntire's broadcasts. By the mid-1960's when he purchased WXUR,
Rev. McIntire, whose program aired on hundreds of radio stations across
the nation, was a superstar in the group of highly controversial right-
wing radio ministers.8 6 The transfer of the license was opposed by main-
stream civic and religious groups in the Philadelphia area who were con-
cerned about having a station in the area that would be controlled by
such a man. The Commission granted the transfer application, but took
the unusual step of warning McIntire about the obligations of the Fair-
ness Doctrine, which his statement of proposed programming had-nat-
80. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1124 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 1125, 1132-33.
82. Id. at 1155.
83. Id. at 1156.
84. Id. at 1180.
85. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).




When challenged by the same groups again at renewal, McIntire
was forced to a hearing. "At the heart" 88 of the proceeding was the Fair-
ness Doctrine. McIntire had been violating it and the personal attack
rules in the same way that other stations ran commercials or played
Beatles records-he did it as a matter of course without even thinking
about it. Monitoring by both the Broadcast Bureau of the FCC and com-
plaining groups provided proof that would convict in any capital case.
The principal offending show, entitled "Freedom of Speech," was hosted
by Tom Livezey, a man described by former CBS News President Fred
Friendly as possessing a "special talent for attracting those citizens of the
City of Brotherly Love who stayed up late worrying about Jews, blacks,
radicals, and Billy Graham."8 9 What follows will allow one to get a gist
of the program:
CALLER: About this B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League ... why
don't they get upset at all this smut and filth that's going through the
mails?
LIVEZEY: And who do you think is behind all this obscenity that
daily floods our mails, my dear?
CALLER: Well, frankly, Tom, I think it is the Jewish people.
LIVEZEY: You bet your life it is.90
Amazingly, the hearing examiner ruled for WXUR. In a conclusion
too neat by half, he in part excused the violations on the ground that
WXUR put out so much controversial programming while the station
was short on staff that it was impossible to keep up with all the viola-
tions.91 His other justification was more interesting. No one could deny
that WXUR was meeting one of the asserted purposes of the Fairness
Doctrine, the presentation of controversial programming. Few sta-
tions-and none owned by CBS, NBC, ABC, or the Washington Post-
could come close. And as for balance, the hearing examiner held that
anyone wishing to hear the other side of the issues presented on WXUR
could do so with ease; in the Philadelphia area all other viewpoints were
available and no listener need be uninformed. But with the silencing of
McIntire that was no longer the case. Prior to his purchase of WXUR,
McIntire's type of voice was unavailable in Philadelphia and it became so
again after the FCC ruled adversely to him. Denying WXUR renewal
87. In re Borst, 4 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 697, 700 (1965).
88. In re Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 21 (1970).
89. F. FRIENDLY, supra note 71, at 80.
90. Id. at 81.
91. See In re Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 42, 53, 70, 71, 135, 138-39
(1968) (initial decision of hearing examiner; lack of attention to personal attacks deemed "less repre-




thus served none of the affirmative purposes of the Fairness Doctrine
while in fact reducing both the amount of controversy and the range of
available opinion on the air in Philadelphia.92
Nice try, but legally irrelevant, held the FCC.93 Once Fairness Doc-
trine violations of that magnitude were found, it held, the excuses pro-
vided by the hearing examiner were entitled to no weight. The station
was a rogue and death was the only appropriate sanction.
By the luck of the draw, on appeal McIntire drew the most
favorable conceivable panel of the District of Columbia Circuit, one in-
cluding its two most liberal members, Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge
Skelly Wright. But it was to no avail. The third member, Judge Edward
Tamm, agreed with everything the Commission said.94 Judge Wright ig-
nored what the Commission said was the "heart" of the matter and in-
stead relied on McIntire's breach of his promise to obey the Fairness
Doctrine rather than on his violations of the Fairness Doctrine, as if
somehow that were a distinction of substance.95 Chief Judge Bazelon
authored a rare dissent, against application of the doctrine, but it was
just that-a dissent.96 It was not even enough to pick up the necessary
four votes for Supreme Court review by certiorari. Justice Douglas
wished to hear the case, but no one else did.97
3. Incoherence as an Inescapable Feature of the Fairness Doctrine.
The McIntire episode thus demonstrates that the Fairness Doctrine has
some content. The four examples collectively, however, show that the
content is incoherent. By what system of logic or intuition could one
92. See id. at 138-39 (initial decision of hearing examiner; removing WXUR from the air would
discourage free discussion on the air and deprive listeners of militant viewpoints, thus defeating
purpose of the Doctrine); see also Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 68-70 &
n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (FCC's strict rendering of fairness requirements
deprives radio audience of "robust debate on innumerable controversies" and will have chilling effect
on other broadcasters) (citing In re Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 42, 134 (1968),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). McIntire's own radio program had been cancelled by its only
Philadelphia outlet prior to his purchase of WXUR, and he believed his viewpoint was not available
in the market. 24 F.C.C.2d at 44-45. There was no indication in the record that in the time McIn-
tire operated WXUR another equivalent substitute entered the market.
93. 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 27, 33 (1970) (decision of FCC) (failure to comply with requirements of
Fairness Doctrine not excusable because of size of staff or unavailability of alternative outlet for
airing controversial views).
94. Brandywine-MainLine Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d at 60-61 (finding "no justification for
upsetting a sanction so well substantiated by the record and findings of the Commission").
95. See id. at 62-63 (Wright, J., concurring) (concurrence based on licensee's deceptive promise
to Commission to comply and subsequent treatment of public license as if "it were private property
nonencumbered by public obligations").
96. Id. at 63-80 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).




predict that a bevy of commissioners and judges setting out to protect the
public's right to hear all sides of controversial issues would find that, of
these four broadcasters, WXUR and only WXUR presented a target
worthy of their firepower?
We believe the cases demonstrate an inherent dilemma in the Fair-
ness Doctrine. If the doctrine is to be taken seriously then suspected
violations lurk everywhere and the FCC should undertake continuous
oversight of the industry. If the FCC will not-or cannot-do that, then
the doctrine must be toothless except for the randomly-selected few who
are surprised to feel its bite after the fact. Furthermore, as the McIntire
facts demonstrate, it is likely that the egregious cases where enforcement
will occur will continue to involve stations that air significantly more
controversial programming than the average. Thus, the doctrine will be
enforced against those who best serve one of the stated purposes of the
Fairness Doctrine: broadcasting controversial programming. The Fair-
ness Doctrine is at war with controversy and diversity.
Opponents of the Fairness Doctrine can describe easily how the
cases described above should have been handled. The results in the net-
work cases were correct-although not for the reasons given-because of
the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 98 And, so long
as radios have dials, the McIntire case was wrongly decided.
Proponents of the Fairness Doctrine have to explain either how the
outcomes in these cases can be reconciled satisfactorily or how a differ-
ently administered doctrine could yield coherent results in these cases.
The most obvious ground for reconciling the actual results is that televi-
sion network programming is exempt from the doctrine. This rationale,
however, fails to explain other cases and, more importantly, leaves one
wondering why anyone else should be subject to it.
If proponents mean to defend a doctrine that might exist, but never
has, our best guess is that they believe all three network cases are
wrongly decided. Certainly any lesser claim would still leave a toothless
and incoherent doctrine. Yet, if the network cases were wrongly decided,
the doctrine's proponents still must answer several questions. What if
the network contends, as in Private Pilots, that the program was true and
the asserted opposing viewpoint is false? Would it have been sufficient,
as the FCC argued in NBC, for NBC to provide time on the "Today
Show," an early morning program, for views opposing the dominant
theme of Pensions, a prime time "documentary?" 99 If the passage of pen-
98. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
99. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 71, at 156.
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sion reform legislation mooted the NBC case, did the coverage of the
Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the candidacy of Ronald Reagan, or
the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe moot the ASCEF com-
plaint, which centered on events in 1972-73?
These are serious questions that strike at the heart of the issue
whether the Fairness Doctrine has, or could have, any intelligible con-
tent. For opponents of the doctrine, however, it would be specious to try
to answer them. But it is not unfair to ask. If the Fairness Doctrine is to
survive the assaults presently levelled at it, surely those who would
choose to retain the rule owe an obligation to explain what it is.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We do not believe Goldilocks would have stayed in the Three Bears'
house for over forty years had she always found the porridge, chairs, and
beds too hot or too cold, too big or too small, too hard or too soft. Simi-
larly, the FCC should abandon, or be forced to abandon, a doctrine-
now in its fifth decade-that violates every accepted principle of first
amendment jurisprudence, represents an ill-advised and inefficacious reg-
ulatory policy, and has no ascertainable content.
Honoring the journalistic ethic of thorough and balanced coverage
is a noble goal. Legislating and enforcing such behavior, however, is at
best a meaningless and futile gesture, at worst a counterproductive and
unconstitutional act. If every generation nevertheless must indulge itself
in one such gesture, it would be far better to bring back the 1962 Mets
than to retain the Fairness Doctrine.
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